Category: Security Advisories / Microsoft 365Applies to: SOCFortress SIEM stack with the Office 365 integration (ar-1045), optionally the Microsoft Entra ID integration (ar-1056)Audience: CustomersRelated advisory: FBI FLASH-20261113-001, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework (TLP:CLEAR)
ARTEX is an open-source, AI-driven intrusion framework that automates an attack from reconnaissance to data theft at machine speed. The FBI reports intrusions reaching privileged access in under three hours, campaigns across energy, government, financial and other sectors since August 2026, and a supply chain compromise through a backup vendor's Microsoft 365 integration that led to sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 downstream tenants.
Much of what ARTEX does in Microsoft 365 happens through applications, service principals and the Microsoft Graph API rather than through a user typing a password. The published IP addresses are short-lived, and the FBI says not to limit your review to them. Catching this activity depends on two things: collecting the right Microsoft 365 telemetry, and running behavioral detections against it.
This article covers what ARTEX does in Microsoft 365, what SOCFortress detects, what your SIEM can and cannot see today, a self-test you can run, how to close the gaps, and what to do if you suspect activity.
Taken from the FBI FLASH:
IOC matching. The IP addresses and domains from the FLASH are loaded into Graylog lookup tables and checked in real time against Microsoft 365 sign-in IPs, endpoint network connections, DNS queries and firewall logs. Treat these as a supplement: the FBI notes the infrastructure may already be reassigned.
Behavioral detections. These CoPilot Searches run against your Office 365 audit data (CoPilot > CoPilot Searches > Microsoft 365):
They sit alongside the existing Microsoft 365 rules for MFA being disabled, Conditional Access bypass, new federated domains, inbox rules, mail forwarding and mass downloads. We enable them per tenant after testing them against your own data, so ask us if you'd like them turned on.
The Office 365 integration (ar-1045) collects the Office 365 Management Activity feed. That covers a lot, but not everything ARTEX touches.
The rows marked No are exactly where Microsoft observed the vendor integration campaign in the FLASH. The next sections show how to check your tenant and close those gaps.
Run these before contacting support. They take about 15 minutes and answer most of the questions we will ask.
In Exchange Online PowerShell:
Connect-ExchangeOnline Get-AdminAuditLogConfig | Format-List UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled
Expected: UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled : True
UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled : True
Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List AuditDisabled (Get-Mailbox -Identity user@yourdomain.com).AuditOwner -contains "MailItemsAccessed"
Expected: AuditDisabled : False, then True. If the second command returns False, mailbox reads are not being logged for that mailbox.
AuditDisabled : False
True
False
Exporting service principal sign-ins and Graph activity logs requires Entra ID P1 or P2.
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Organization.Read.All" Get-MgSubscribedSku | Select-Object SkuPartNumber, ConsumedUnits
P1 is included with AAD_PREMIUM, Microsoft 365 Business Premium (SPB) and Microsoft 365 E3 (SPE_E3). P2 is included with AAD_PREMIUM_P2 and Microsoft 365 E5 (SPE_E5).
AAD_PREMIUM
SPB
SPE_E3
AAD_PREMIUM_P2
SPE_E5
This lists enterprise applications published by other organizations (Microsoft's own apps are excluded):
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Application.Read.All" $tenant = (Get-MgContext).TenantId $microsoft = @("f8cdef31-a31e-4b4a-93e4-5f571e91255a", "72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47") Get-MgServicePrincipal -All -Filter "servicePrincipalType eq 'Application'" | Where-Object { $_.AppOwnerOrganizationId -and $_.AppOwnerOrganizationId -ne $tenant -and $microsoft -notcontains $_.AppOwnerOrganizationId } | Select-Object DisplayName, AppId, PublisherName, AccountEnabled | Sort-Object DisplayName
Review every vendor you don't recognize, and every backup, RMM or MSP tool, including disabled ones (AccountEnabled is False). The FBI asks organizations that ever used an affected vendor integration to check by application ID, not display name, even if the integration is no longer in use. Ask the vendor for their application IDs if you're unsure.
AccountEnabled
Get-MgApplication -All | Select-Object DisplayName, AppId, @{n='Secrets';e={$_.PasswordCredentials.Count}}, @{n='Certificates';e={$_.KeyCredentials.Count}} | Where-Object { $_.Secrets -gt 0 -or $_.Certificates -gt 0 }
Any secret or certificate nobody can explain should be investigated and rotated.
Search the last 30 days:
data_office365_Workload:AzureActiveDirectory
Open quick values on data_office365_Operation. You should see directory operations such as "Add member to role." or "Update user.", not only UserLoggedIn and UserLoginFailed.
data_office365_Operation
UserLoggedIn
UserLoginFailed
data_office365_Operation:"MailItemsAccessed"
Any results here mean mailbox reads are reaching the SIEM.
If the self-test shows only sign-ins and no directory operations, or no MailItemsAccessed, open a case. We will check the subscriptions on our side, and you may need a mailbox audit or licensing change on yours.
ServicePrincipalSignInLogs
ManagedIdentitySignInLogs
NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
Graph activity logs can be high volume in busy tenants. We'll go over the expected volume with you before connecting them.
If you already use the Entra ID integration (ar-1056), add the Microsoft Graph application permissions IdentityRiskEvent.Read.All and IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All to the same app, grant admin consent, and let us know.
IdentityRiskEvent.Read.All
IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All
If you run Azure subscriptions, App Services or storage accounts, open a case and we'll scope Azure activity and resource logs with you.
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