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Detecting ARTEX-Style Activity in Microsoft 365

Category: Security Advisories / Microsoft 365
Applies to: SOCFortress SIEM stack with the Office 365 integration (ar-1045), optionally the Microsoft Entra ID integration (ar-1056)
Audience: Customers
Related advisory: FBI FLASH-20261113-001, Threat Overview of ARTEX Autonomous Penetration Testing Framework (TLP:CLEAR)


Summary

ARTEX is an open-source, AI-driven intrusion framework that automates an attack from reconnaissance to data theft at machine speed. The FBI reports intrusions reaching privileged access in under three hours, campaigns across energy, government, financial and other sectors since August 2026, and a supply chain compromise through a backup vendor's Microsoft 365 integration that led to sign-in attempts against more than 2,250 downstream tenants.

Much of what ARTEX does in Microsoft 365 happens through applications, service principals and the Microsoft Graph API rather than through a user typing a password. The published IP addresses are short-lived, and the FBI says not to limit your review to them. Catching this activity depends on two things: collecting the right Microsoft 365 telemetry, and running behavioral detections against it.

This article covers what ARTEX does in Microsoft 365, what SOCFortress detects, what your SIEM can and cannot see today, a self-test you can run, how to close the gaps, and what to do if you suspect activity.


What ARTEX does in Microsoft 365

Taken from the FBI FLASH:

Behavior ATT&CK Where it shows up
Maps the permissions of stolen cloud credentials with rapid, automated checks T1087.004, T1069.003, T1526 Sign-in logs, directory audit, Graph activity logs
Signs in through compromised multi-tenant or vendor applications T1199, T1078.004 Service principal sign-ins, Graph activity logs
Adds credentials to existing OAuth applications T1098.001 Entra directory audit
Takes over accounts through password resets T1098 Entra directory audit
Reads mailboxes T1114.002 Exchange MailItemsAccessed, Graph activity logs
Abuses cross-tenant trust and B2B federation from partner tenants T1199, T1484.002 Entra directory audit, sign-in logs
Produces bursts of failed attempts with small, iterative changes T1110 Sign-in logs

What SOCFortress detects

IOC matching. The IP addresses and domains from the FLASH are loaded into Graylog lookup tables and checked in real time against Microsoft 365 sign-in IPs, endpoint network connections, DNS queries and firewall logs. Treat these as a supplement: the FBI notes the infrastructure may already be reassigned.

Behavioral detections. These CoPilot Searches run against your Office 365 audit data (CoPilot > CoPilot Searches > Microsoft 365):

  • Service principal or application credentials added
  • OAuth consent or application permission granted
  • Application or service principal owner added
  • Directory role assigned (including PIM)
  • Conditional Access or authentication policy changed
  • Cross-tenant access or partner relationship changed
  • Failed sign-in burst against one account
  • Password spray from one IP
  • Bulk admin password resets by one person
  • One identity reading many mailboxes

They sit alongside the existing Microsoft 365 rules for MFA being disabled, Conditional Access bypass, new federated domains, inbox rules, mail forwarding and mass downloads. We enable them per tenant after testing them against your own data, so ask us if you'd like them turned on.


What your SIEM can and cannot see

The Office 365 integration (ar-1045) collects the Office 365 Management Activity feed. That covers a lot, but not everything ARTEX touches.

Telemetry Collected by the Office 365 integration What it catches
Interactive user sign-ins Yes Password spray, failed sign-in bursts, sign-ins from known bad IPs
Entra directory audit (app credentials, consent, roles, Conditional Access, owners) Yes, when the AzureActiveDirectory feed is enabled Persistence and privilege steps
Exchange MailItemsAccessed Yes, when your licensing and mailbox audit settings log it Bulk mailbox reads
Service principal and managed identity sign-ins No Abuse of applications and vendor integrations
Non-interactive user sign-ins Partly Token replay
Microsoft Graph activity logs No Graph API reconnaissance and data access
Identity Protection risk detections No (available through the Entra ID integration, ar-1056) Risky users and sign-ins
Azure activity, storage and App Service (Kudu) logs No Only relevant if you run Azure workloads

The rows marked No are exactly where Microsoft observed the vendor integration campaign in the FLASH. The next sections show how to check your tenant and close those gaps.


Self-test

Run these before contacting support. They take about 15 minutes and answer most of the questions we will ask.

1. Unified audit log is on

In Exchange Online PowerShell:

Connect-ExchangeOnline
Get-AdminAuditLogConfig | Format-List UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled

Expected: UnifiedAuditLogIngestionEnabled : True

2. Mailbox auditing records MailItemsAccessed

Get-OrganizationConfig | Format-List AuditDisabled
(Get-Mailbox -Identity user@yourdomain.com).AuditOwner -contains "MailItemsAccessed"

Expected: AuditDisabled : False, then True. If the second command returns False, mailbox reads are not being logged for that mailbox.

3. Your Entra ID license tier

Exporting service principal sign-ins and Graph activity logs requires Entra ID P1 or P2.

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Organization.Read.All"
Get-MgSubscribedSku | Select-Object SkuPartNumber, ConsumedUnits

P1 is included with AAD_PREMIUM, Microsoft 365 Business Premium (SPB) and Microsoft 365 E3 (SPE_E3). P2 is included with AAD_PREMIUM_P2 and Microsoft 365 E5 (SPE_E5).

4. Third-party applications in your tenant

This lists enterprise applications published by other organizations (Microsoft's own apps are excluded):

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Application.Read.All"
$tenant = (Get-MgContext).TenantId
$microsoft = @("f8cdef31-a31e-4b4a-93e4-5f571e91255a", "72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47")
Get-MgServicePrincipal -All -Filter "servicePrincipalType eq 'Application'" |
 Where-Object { $_.AppOwnerOrganizationId -and $_.AppOwnerOrganizationId -ne $tenant -and $microsoft -notcontains $_.AppOwnerOrganizationId } |
 Select-Object DisplayName, AppId, PublisherName, AccountEnabled |
 Sort-Object DisplayName

Review every vendor you don't recognize, and every backup, RMM or MSP tool, including disabled ones (AccountEnabled is False). The FBI asks organizations that ever used an affected vendor integration to check by application ID, not display name, even if the integration is no longer in use. Ask the vendor for their application IDs if you're unsure.

5. Your own app registrations with secrets or certificates

Get-MgApplication -All |
 Select-Object DisplayName, AppId,
 @{n='Secrets';e={$_.PasswordCredentials.Count}},
 @{n='Certificates';e={$_.KeyCredentials.Count}} |
 Where-Object { $_.Secrets -gt 0 -or $_.Certificates -gt 0 }

Any secret or certificate nobody can explain should be investigated and rotated.

6. In the SIEM (if you have Graylog access)

Search the last 30 days:

data_office365_Workload:AzureActiveDirectory

Open quick values on data_office365_Operation. You should see directory operations such as "Add member to role." or "Update user.", not only UserLoggedIn and UserLoginFailed.

data_office365_Operation:"MailItemsAccessed"

Any results here mean mailbox reads are reaching the SIEM.


Closing the gaps

Office 365 feed

If the self-test shows only sign-ins and no directory operations, or no MailItemsAccessed, open a case. We will check the subscriptions on our side, and you may need a mailbox audit or licensing change on yours.

Service principal sign-ins and Graph activity logs (Entra ID P1 or P2)

  1. In the Microsoft Entra admin center, go to Monitoring & health > Diagnostic settings > Add diagnostic setting.
  2. Select these log categories:
    • ServicePrincipalSignInLogs
    • ManagedIdentitySignInLogs
    • NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
    • MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
  3. Choose "Archive to a storage account" and select a storage account dedicated to this purpose.
  4. On the storage account, add a lifecycle management rule that deletes blobs after 7 days. The SIEM keeps its own copy.
  5. Open a case. We will confirm the read-only access method for the storage account and connect it to your SIEM.

Graph activity logs can be high volume in busy tenants. We'll go over the expected volume with you before connecting them.

Identity Protection risk detections (Entra ID P2)

If you already use the Entra ID integration (ar-1056), add the Microsoft Graph application permissions IdentityRiskEvent.Read.All and IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All to the same app, grant admin consent, and let us know.

Azure workloads

If you run Azure subscriptions, App Services or storage accounts, open a case and we'll scope Azure activity and resource logs with you.


Hardening checklist (from the FLASH)

  • Inventory every internet-facing application, including the peripheral ones: partner and vendor portals, payment or outage sites, mobile backends and legacy services.
  • Restrict App Service Kudu/SCM endpoints and other management interfaces to trusted networks, and disable basic publishing authentication where it isn't needed.
  • Apply least privilege to multi-tenant application permissions. Restrict user consent to verified publishers or turn it off.
  • Review Entra audit records for application credential additions, new applications, service principals and owners, consent grants, app role assignments, privileged role assignments, and Conditional Access changes. Rotate credentials if anything is unexplained.
  • Review successful and failed service principal sign-ins separately, and don't limit the review to the published IPs.
  • Scan code repositories, configuration files and CI/CD pipelines for embedded secrets, and rotate any you find.

If you suspect ARTEX activity

  1. Preserve evidence before making changes: Entra sign-in and audit logs, Purview audit records, and SIEM data. Don't delay urgent containment while waiting for exports.
  2. Disable, don't delete. The FBI advises against deleting enterprise applications as a first response, because their configuration is evidence.
  3. Open a case with SOCFortress and include:
    • The time window (the FBI recommends reviewing from at least October 1, 2026)
    • Affected accounts and application IDs
    • Source IPs you've seen
    • Anything you've already changed or blocked
  4. Report to the FBI at ic3.gov or your local FBI field office.

References

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